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The federal government stands poised to exercise its constitutional right to regulate financial markets,
an area traditionally left to competing provincial securities commissions.  The current state of securities
regulation renders impotent US-style takeover defences, such as poison pills and staggered boards,
but allows voting caps and pyramiding in their stead. Various federal securities regulation models
are weighted in light of the current state of their needed complementary institutions. One option, for
which Canada is relatively well prepared, is the British model of activist independent institutional










Democracy matters. Political democracy lets voters remove politicians whose policies or ethics 
displease them.  Economists  increasingly  appreciate  that  shareholder democracy  also  matters. 
Economies generate greater prosperity if small shareholders can remove top insiders corporate 
whose policies or ethics displease them. Like political democracy, shareholder democracy works 
differently in different countries, and shareholder democracy in Canada is remarkably stunted 
compared to that in the United States and United Kingdom, despite a shared Common Law 
heritage.   
 This democratic deficit matters. Millions of middle-class Canadian savers now shares. 
Canadian workers have amassed huge pension funds since the 1970s, and these funds are now 
major  shareholders  in  great  Canadian  companies.  As  First  Nations  win  large  land  rights 
settlements,  they too  are becoming potential major players in  the stock market.  Shareholder 
democracy could be a major tool for empowering not only workers and retirees but previously 
marginalized elements of society and the whole of the middle class. 
In  theory,  big  business  in  Canada  should  be  more  democratic  than  ever,  and  more 
democratic than American big business. Canadian institutional investors are huge and growing. 
Workers‘ pension funds and middle-class investors should be voting CEOs in and out of office, 
demanding  explanations,  and  marching  corporate  auditors  to  and  fro.  Canadian  courts  and 
regulators  have  emasculated  the  poison  pills  and  staggered  boards  that  limit  American 
shareholders‘  power  over  American  corporate  managers  (Gompers,  Ishii  and  Metrick  2003; 
Bebchuk  and  Cohen  2005),  so  Canadian  corporations  should  be  more democratic  than  their 
American cousins.  2 
 
In practice, the typical big Canadian corporation is arguably less democratic than in the 
past,  and less democratic than  its  peers in both America and Great  Britain. This  is because 
corporate  insiders  dominate  the  shareholder  meetings  of  listed  Canadian  firms  to  an  extent 
generally not seen in either the United States or the United Kingdom, and because Canadian 
legislatures, courts, regulators, and exchanges accept and passively perpetuate this. 
  Shareholder democracy, like political democracy, is not an end per se; but a means to 
ensure good governance. If a benevolent dictator created a paradise on earth, citizens might 
acquiesce  to  a  dearth  of  plebiscites;  and  if  dictatorial  tycoons‘  corporations  were  unrivalled 
creators of wealth, high-paying jobs, and tax revenues, a democratic deficit in their shareholder 
meetings  might  be  acceptable.  But  a  large  and  growing  body  of  evidence  shows  Canadian 
corporations underperforming across the board.  
This is no coincidence, for much empirical evidence links shareholder democracy to firm 
and economy performance. Top corporate insiders who are more accountable to shareholders 
appear to deliver better firm performance in the United States, across countries, and in Canada.  
This  chapter  argues  that  Canada‘s  lawmakers  and  courts  seem  little  concerned  about 
shareholders meagre rights, but deeply worried that influential corporate insiders might object to 
stronger  oversight.  With  federal  securities  regulation  on  the  horizon,  reforms  to  enhance 
shareholder democracy are feasible as ways to invigorate the economy – elevating shareholder 
wealth, creating jobs, and fattening the government tax coffers that pay for social programs.   
 
The Performance of Canada’s Corporate Sector 
 Despite escaping the worst effects of the 2007 financial panic, Canadian firms have a long track 
record of underperformance  relative to their American peers.  A firm‘s performance can be 3 
 
measured in many ways, and Canadian big business is remarkably consistent in underperforming 
across alternative measures.    
One set of metrics gauge firms‘ productivity: their ability to turn given amounts of inputs, 
including labour and capital, into more economically valuable outputs. Economists favour this 
measure because it accords with their notion of efficiency as avoiding waste. Using the country‘s 
workforce and savings to produce fewer or shoddier goods and services than could be produced 
is wasteful, and thus poor corporate performance. 
  Figure 1 summarizes Canadian firms‘ lagging productivity. Canadian firms need more 
inputs – workers and physical capital – to produce the same output as their US rivals. The figure 
shows a deficit against not just America, but against all other major industrialized countries too. 
The  deficit  is  clearly  not  a  data  fluke  –  it  is  evident  across  many  different  techniques  for 
measuring productivity (Baldwin, Gu and Yan 2008). It‘s not that American firms are unusually 
productive: something is retarding Canadian firms.  
  Though ardent neoclassical economists might dissent, productivity is not always the best 
performance gauge. Perhaps Canadian businesses are less productive, but excel in other ways?  








Source: Statistics Canada (2007), Catalogue no. 15-206.  
 
B.  Percentage  Growth  in  Total  Factor  Productivity,  Canada  vs.  Other  Major  Industrialized 
Countries from 1995 to 2008 or most recent year. 
 













Total factor productivity measures the increase in “value-added” by each country’s business sector over 
and above the cost of its inputs. Higher productivity growth means a country’s businesses are making 
higher value outputs, using lower value inputs, or both. Productivity is a central measure of the extent to 
which a country’s business sector is contributes to overall economic prosperity. Data are available 
through 2008 for all countries except for Australia, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the U.K, 
whose data ends in 2007.. Source:  www.oecd.org.   5 
 
One alternative performance measure is shareholder value – how high the share price is 
relative to what it might be under the best possible management. This metric seems as obvious to 
financial  analysts  as  productivity  seems  to  neoclassical  economists  –  shareholders  own 
businesses, this metric says businesses should be run to make shareholders rich. 
Perhaps Canada‘s firms are less productive but create more wealth for their shareholders? 
This too can be checked. Figure 2 summarizes a recent study contrasting the shareholder wealth 
created by listed Canadian firms to that created by comparable listed American firms. It shows 
that Canadian firms are markedly less effective at creating shareholder value.   
But shareholder value creation, like productivity, might still not be the right metric. A 
recent film entitled The Corporation, based on the book The Corporation: The Pathological 
Pursuit of Profit and Power by Joel Bakan, and starring Elaine Bernard, Paul Weiler‘s colleague 
at Harvard Law School‘s Labor and Worklife Program, delightfully pillories a narrow-minded 
focus on shareholder value. The film holds that ethical judgment, not blind pursuit of profit or 
wealth, should motivate those entrusted with the governance of a country‘s great corporations. 
This conclusion is hard to argue with, but easy to argue about. Of course, corporations 
should be run ethically, but what does that mean? The most outspoken advocates of ethical 
behaviour  in  any  country  are  often  its  most  religious  citizens,  but  no  one  would  seriously 
advocate turning Canada‘s great corporations over to priests or ministers, let alone televangelists. 
An ethical metre-stick of corporate performance needs to be both easily readable and marked in a 
way acceptable to the majority of citizens in a democracy. At present, we are in only the earliest 






FIGURE 2  
The Canada Discount: Shareholder value of Canadian Firms (Solid lines) Versus US Firms (Dotted 
Lines) of Similar Size and in Similar Industries, 1989–2004.    
 
Panel A.  Market Values as Multiples of Book Value 
 
Panel B.  Price-to-Earnings Ratios 
 
Panel C.  Tobin’s Average Q Ratios 
 
Panel D. Price-to-Cash Flow Ratios 
 
Shareholder  value  is  expressed  relative  to  four  commonly  used  benchmarks.    Panel  A  presents  mean  ratios  of 
shareholder value over book value of assets. Panel B uses mean price-earnings ratios, estimated as calendar year-
end share price over earnings during the previous 12 months. Panel C presents Tobin's average q ratios, estimated 
as total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity, scaled by total assets. Panel D displays price-
cash flow ratios, computed as the sum of long-term debt, debt in current liabilities, preferred stock and market value 
of equity scaled by operating income before depreciation. In all cases, stock prices are at calendar year-end and 
balance sheet items are at the most recent fiscal year-end. Source: King and Segal (2008).  
 
Such a metre-stick ought perhaps to consider how well a firm serves its employees. This 
too  can  be  measured.  Perhaps  Canadian  firms  post  lower  productivity  and  generate  less 
shareholder  wealth  but  pay  their  employees  more.  But  Figure  3  shows  Canadian  per  capita 
income below that of the United States, and hovering at levels comparable with those of Britain. 
Another possible metric is overall employment. Perhaps Canada‘s great corporations post 
low productivity, generate little wealth for their shareholders, and pay their workers less, but 7 
 
keep more workers on to limit unemployment. This too can be checked. But Panel B ofFigure 3 
shows Canada‘s unemployment rate worse than in either the US or UK until the recent crisis.  
 
FIGURE 3 
Canadian Wages and Unemployment Rate Compared 
 
A.  Real  Per Capita GDPs, in  Constant 2000 US  dollars at   of Canada and the United  States, , 
Converted to Constant 2000 US Dollars at Purchasing Power Parity  
 
 
B. Unemployment Rates, in Percent, of Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom  
 




























Of course, these metrics too can be challenged. Shareholders also have jobs and earn 
wages from their employer. Workers are also shareholders via their pension funds and savings. 
Pension funds now account for a huge fraction of the total savings of the Canadian economy. In 
fact, Figure 4 shows that workers‘ pension funds are actually larger in Canada than in the United 
States or United Kingdom, relative to the size of the economy. Workers, like other shareholders, 
may well see shareholder value maximization, constrained by the laws of Canada and the ethical 
standards of Canadians, as  a decreasingly  radical  idea.  If anything, aging Canadian workers 
ought to be increasingly concerned about pension fund portfolio values.  
 
FIGURE 4 
Canadian Pension Funds Compared 
 
 
Pension fund assets as fraction of total stock market capitalization for selected developed economies. 
Source: Pension assets are from Watson Wyatt and various secondary sources, as reported in the FEI 
Canada Accounting & Finance Review, February 2006. Market capitalizations are from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators database.    
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The list of possible performance metrics is endless, and almost anything is admissible. 
For example, value-destroying firms may truly be extremely well run and entirely worth their 
shareholders‘ quiet respect. Jesus teaches that ―love of money is the root of all evil,‖ and perhaps 
Canadians  appreciate  the  freedom  from  evil  brought  by  low  productivity,  anaemic  wealth 
creation, low wages, and high unemployment. But such saintliness seems implausible in the land 
of the Winnipeg General Strike.  
 
It’s Nice to Be an Insider in Canada 
In  the  1980s,  studies  by  Eckbo  (1986;  1988)  raised  eyebrows  by  contrasting  stock  price 
movements around corporate takeovers in Canada versus in the United States. The solid grey line 
in  Figure  5  epitomizes  the  well-known  pattern  in  the  United  States  (Westin,  Mitchell,  and 
Mulherin 2004), tracing out how the target firm‘s share price moves relatively little until the 
bidder makes a public announcement that a takeover is in the offing, whereupon the target firm‘s 
stock price shoots up – often by 30 percent or more within minutes.  
 
The economics behind this price increase are complicated, but in many cases boil down 
to the acquirer firm‘s top mangers being expected to operate the target firm more efficiently, or 
at least less inefficiently.
1 Except in leveraged buyouts in the 1980s and 1990s, this efficiency 
gain does not seem detrimental to workers  – acquired firms do not fire workers or cut wages 
relative to otherwise similar firms that remain independent (Shleifer and Summers 2000; Westin, 
Mitchell, and Mulherin 2004). Overall, the empirical evidence shows that shareholders do better, 
and workers no worse, if firms are more vulnerable to takeovers.  
                                                 
1 For a full explanation of the economics, theory and evidence, supporting this view, see Westin, Mitchell, and 
Mulherin (2004). 10 
 
FIGURE 5 




Upon the news that it may be a takeover target, a firm’s share price rises markedly. In the United States 
this increase occurs in the minutes or hours immediately following the announcement. In Canada the 
target price generally begins rising sooner. Source: Graphical summary of findings in Bris (2005); Eckbo 




For our purposes, the key revelation is that the target firm‘s share price holds steady and 
then shoots up once investors learn that a control change is in the works. This contrasts markedly 
with the dotted black line that traces out a stylized Canadian corporate takeover. Here the target‘s 
share  price  slowly  levitates  upward  during  the  two  to  three  months  before  the  takeover  is 
announced and then moves relatively little when the plans are made public. Eckbo (1986, 1988) 
interprets this as evidence of more energetic and lucrative insider trading in Canada.  
Remarkably, a recent study (Bris 2005) shows little change in two decades. In fact, after 
comparing statistically meaningful samples of takeovers on each of the world‘s active stock 
exchanges, he reports that Canada permits the most lucrative insider trading in any developed 
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information, and even jail the occasional home decorating guru like Martha Stewart. But Canada, 
with insider trading laws that read much like those in the United States, did not see its first 
genuine criminal conviction for insider trading until 2010.
2    
After I mentioned this anomaly in a seminar for senior Canadian business leaders, one 
explained why it was good for the country. First, he clarified, if shareholders really didn‘t like it, 
they  could  sanction  the  corporate  insiders  at  the  next  shareholders  meeting.  Second,  he 
continued, since Canadian top corporate insiders make a bit extra on the side by trading in their 
firm‘s stocks, they accept lower salaries. Neither point, unfortunately, can be tested.   Canadian 
top  corporate  executives,  unlike  their  American  peers,  have  not  faced  firm  requirements  to 
disclose  their  insider  trades  until  2010,  and  still  need  not  make  public  their  individual 
compensation packages.   
 
Limits on Shareholder Democracy in Canada 
Shareholder democracy in Canada is free of staggered boards – one of its major constraints in the 
United States.  Staggered boards let shareholders elect a third of the board to a three year term 
each year, and have gained popularity with US corporate insiders seeking to limit the power of 
outside shareholders.  By forcing dissidents to wait two years to replace a majority of the board 
and three years to replace it entirely, staggered boards effectively entrench insiders to an extent 
sufficient to significantly depress shareholder value in the affected firms (Bebchuk and Cohen 
2008).   
                                                 
2 See In The Matter of the Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. S.5, As Amended v. Stanko Joseph Grmovsek and Gil I. 
Cornblum, 2009). A mining company executive was previously convicted of insider trading as a lesser charge to 
fraud and, upon appeal, sentenced to 6 months and fined C$1 M  (In the Matter of the Securities Act R.S.O. 1990 c. 
S 5, as amended v. Glenn Harvey Harper, 2004)  in connection with a mining stock fraud, whose principal 
perpetrators remain unknown (Sergeant 2006, p. 64).   12 
 
In Canada, staggered boards are ineffective because federal and provincial corporations 
laws let shareholders demand emergency meetings at any time, at which all directors can be 
replaced; and these provisions trump any charter amendment to the contrary. This enhances the 
power of shareholders against hired managers.  However, if the managers please controlling 
shareholders, outsider shareholders can be ignored in many cases. A far greater proportion of 
major firms have controlling shareholders in Canada than in either the United States or United 
Kingdom,  so  unhindered  shareholder  power  to  hire  and  fire  the  board  might  properly  be 
translated as unhindered power for the controlling shareholder to appoint the board.   
This has implications for the Canadian economy because previous work shows that firms 
with  entrenched  controlling  shareholders  underperform  (Morck,  Shleifer  and  Vishny  1988; 
McConnell and Servaes 1990: Morck, Stangeland and Yeung 2000) and that economies in which 
most large firms have controlling shareholders underperform (Morck and Yeung 2004; Morck, 
Weinstein and Yeung 2005; Fogel 2007).  
Shareholder  value  is  especially  compromised  where  the  controlling  shareholder 
commands a dominant block of votes without actually owning a proportionate fraction of the 
firm‘s shares (Smith and Amoako-Adu 1995; Gompers, Ishi and Metrick 2010).  This happens in 
two ways in Canada. 
First, a number of Canadian firms have used so-called dual class shares (Amoako-Adu 
and Smith 1995, 2001) to magnify insider shareholders‘ voting power until it eclipses that of 
outsider shareholder.
3 The firm sells one class of shares, usually called  restricted voting shares, 
to the general public. These shares might give their owners one vote per share at the firm‘s 
shareholder  meeting.  The  firm  simultaneously  provides  its  insiders  with  a  different  class  of 
                                                 
3 Dual class shares also exist in the United States and elsewhere. However, they were prohibited on the New York 
Stock Exchange for many decades, and so fell out of favour among firms desiring a ―blue chip‖ reputation. See 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010).  13 
 
shares, usually called superior voting shares, which give their owners many votes per share. This 
practice means that even if the majority of a company‘s shareholders dislike the company‘s top 
insiders,  they  can  lack  the  voting  power  to  do  anything  about  it.  Insiders  increasingly 
disproportionate voting in dual class firms has attracted criticism, and pressure to unify their 
equity into a single class (Smith and Amoako-Adu 2001). 
Such a case played out in 2010, Ontario courts and regulators let Magna controlling 
shareholder Frank Stronach cash in his superior voting shares at a 1,800% premium after 57% 
shareholder vote to allow it, despite the vocal objections of pensions funds with stock in the firm.  
The problem with a simple vote on such an issue is that, even if insiders cannot vote, they frame 
the question:  the issue was not to eliminate the insiders‘ superior voting rights or not, but to 
eliminate them with a huge payment to the insiders or retain disproportionate insider control for 
the  foreseeable  future.    We  cannot  know  how  shareholders  might  have  voted  given  a  third 
option,  such  as  the  removal  of  the  insiders‘‘  superior  voting  rights  at  a  premium  set  by  a 
disinterested third party.   
Second,  many  Canadian  firms  without  dual  class  shares  still  have  controlling 
shareholders, typically very wealthy and well-connected, old-moneyed families. These families 
sometimes command an effective majority through direct ownership of a large voting block, but 
often employ a practice called pyramiding, to enhance their voting power.  
Figure 6 explains how pyramiding magnifies substantial fortunes into control over large 
groups  of  seemingly  distinct  corporations  that,  together,  are  worth  vastly  more.  A  wealthy 
individual or family controls enough stock to dominate the shareholder meeting of one listed 
firm – that at the apex in the figure. This firm, in turn, controls  equity blocks sufficient to 
dominate the shareholder meetings of a second tier of listed firms. These, in turn, each hold 14 
 
control blocks in listed firms in a third tier. As many tiers can be added as the apex firm‘s 
controlling shareholder desires, and each additional tier exponentially increases the corporate 
assets that shareholder controls. Pyramiding thus creates artificial controlling shareholders in 
firms that are really primarily capitalized by outside shareholders such as pension funds and 
small investors.  
Pyramidal  groups  of  this  form  are  the  structures  that  let  small  cliques  of  oligarchic 
families control the economies of many countries in Latin America, Asia, and continental Europe 
– especially Eastern Europe and Russia. This practice is essentially unknown in both the United 
States and United Kingdom, but widespread in Canada and throughout Asia, Latin America, and 







A family firm controls listed firms, each of which controls more listed firms, each of which control yet more 
listed firms. Remaining shares in each firms are held by public investors.   
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Controlling Shareholders around the World  
 
The type of ultimate controlling shareholder, if one is present, in the 20 largest listed corporations in each country as 
of 1996. Control is inferred from a 10 percent voting block. Ultimate “controlling shareholder” means the person at the 
end of any chain of corporate controlling shareholders. The prevalence of controlling shareholder in Japan is probably 
understated because the stakes of equity holders who act together are not aggregated. Figures for Germany include 
proxy voting rights held by universal banks. Source: Baums (1996); La Porta et al. (1998). 
 
 
Canada’s Place in the World 
 
Figure 6 shows that controlling shareholders are far more predominant among large Canadian 
firms than in either the United States or United Kingdom. Canada looks instead much like an 
Asian,  Latin  American,  or  continental  European  country  in  terms  of  the  concentration  of 
economic power evident.   
Pyramiding is little known in the United States because the Depression  era president 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt ended the practice as part of his New Deal. In a series of tax reforms, 
he applied double taxation to inter-corporate dividends. This made large pyramidal structures, in 
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which dividends flow from firm to firm to firm, radically tax-disadvantaged. He also provided 
capital-gains tax incentives for firms either to absorb or spin off listed subsidiaries. To reinforce 
these tax sticks and carrots, he also pushed through the Public Utilities Holding Companies Act, 
which  proscribed  large  pyramids  from  controlling  firms  in  industries  designated  as  ―public 
utilities.‖ Finally, his Investment Companies Act of 1940 subjected firms whose assets are mainly 
shares in other firms to the rules governing investment funds. The last was perhaps overkill, 
because pyramiding had largely disappeared from the United States by the late 1930s.
4 Still, 
Roosevelt‘s attack on America‘s robber barons, as the apex firms‘ controlling shareholders were 
then known, was politically popular – and was never reversed by subsequent administrations, 
including those of Ronald Reagan and the two Bushes.  
Pyramiding disappeared from  the United Kingdom  after that country‘s  pension funds 
successfully lobbied the London Stock Exchange to impose a takeover rule in 1968. That rule, 
later codified, required  any listed  firms‘  controlling shareholders to  own either less than  30 
percent  of  a  firm‘s  shares  or  all  of  them.
5  But  Canada‘s  Depression-era  leaders  showed  no 
interest in emulating Roosevelt‘s drive to democratize business; and Prime Minister Trudeau, in 
power when the LSE rule came into effect, proposed no such thing for Canada.  
Högfeldt  (2005)  argues  that  Sweden‘s  left-leaning  politicians  embraced  pyramiding 
because it simplified ―business-government  cooperation.‖ A Social Democrat  prime minister 
need only phone a few business family patriarchs to cement a deal with ―big business.‖ Perhaps 
Trudeau reached a similar conclusion, or perhaps nationalists in his circle persuaded him that 
entrusting the business sector to wealthy Canadian oligarchs was preferable to risking foreign 
                                                 
4 For a detailed history of this legislation and its impact on the shareholdings structures of American businesses, see 
Morck (2005).  
5 This sequence of reforms is outlined in Franks, Mayer, and Rossi. (2005). Note that widely disbursed ownership 
was commonplace in Britain before this reform as well, though the reform clearly was intended to solidify 
shareholder democracy by ensuring that listed firms remain widely held. 17 
 
takeovers.  Or,  the  increased  government  interventionism  of  the  Trudeau  era  and  subsequent 
governments  might  have  induced  businesses  to  invest  more  in  lobbying  the  government 
(Sawatsky,  1987),  and  large  business  groups  controlled  be  old-moneyed  and  well-connected 
families might have been more effective lobbyers, and hence became favoured players. These 
suggestions are speculative, and a real answer awaits further research.  
Regardless,  a  remarkable  upsurge  in  pyramiding  corresponds  roughly  to  Trudeau‘s 
leadership of the Liberal Party. Figure 8 classifies Canada‘s 100 largest companies, ranked by 
assets, according to who controls them, first decade by decade and then at five-year intervals, 
through the twentieth century. The figure shows a steady drop in family-controlled pyramidal 
groups until Trudeau assumed leadership of the Liberal Party and government, whereupon a 
sudden resurgence occurs.
6 This persists until the 1980s, when Trudeau relinquished power.    
                                                 
6 Figures 9 and 10 are from Tian (2006), and are based on issues of Statistics Canada’s Directory of Inter-Corporate 
Ownership, Canadian Annual Financial Review, and Financial Post Corporate Securities and the Financial Post 
cards data.  For the first half of the century, control is constructed from family and corporate histories plus general 
histories of Canadian business, including Armstrong (1986, 1987), Armstrong and Nelles (1986), Bliss (1986), 
Francis (1986), Khemani, Shapiro, and Stanbury (1988), Marchildon (1990), Maule (1966), Myers (1914), Newman 
(1975, 1981, 1991, 1998), Naylor (1975), Reynolds (1940), and Taylor and Baskerville (1986). 18 
 
FIGURE 8 
The Changing Control of Large Firms through the Twentieth Century 
The Importance of Different Categories of Controlling Shareholders in Top 100 Firms, 1902–1998, 
Weighted by Total Assets (Panel A) and Equally (Panel B). 
 
A.  Asset Weighted  
 
 
B. Equally Weighted 
 
Source: Morck et al. (2005).  19 
 
FIGURE 9  
The Changing Control of Domestically Controlled Private-Sector Firms  
The Importance of Different Categories of Controlling Shareholders in Top 100 Firms, 1902– 1998, 
Weighted by Total Assets and by Number of Firms 
 









































Note:  State-owned  enterprises,  multinational  subsidiaries,  and  firms  whose  control  is  unclear  are 
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In  Canada,  other  categories  –  pyramids  with  widely  held  firms  at  the  apex  and 
freestanding  family  controlled  firms  –  are  relatively  minor  in  terms  of  assets.  However, 
government and foreign controlled firms are major classes. Figure 9 therefore removes foreign 
controlled firms and state-owned enterprises to better reveal the composition of the domestically 
controlled private sector. The figure shows that, in terms of changes to this pattern, the twentieth 
century might easily have been omitted. By its end, family-controlled pyramiding was roughly as 
prevalent as at the century‘s beginning.  A greater importance of concentrated economic power 
relative to United States or United Kingdom is perhaps unsurprising, given Canada‘s tolerance of 
dual class shares, controlling shareholders, and pyramiding, and even the occasional company 
with a corporate charter that lets a controlling family appoint half the directors, veto shareholder 
proposals, and the like. But the time pattern in the figures, however, is both surprising and 
disturbing.  
The turn of the 21
st century brought an abatement in the prominence of large pyramidal 
business groups.  Several large new firms without dual class shares of tiers of listed subsidiaries 
– Research in Motion, EnCana, and Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan.  If this trend holds up, 
Canadian corporate democracy may come nearer its potential.  However, both dual class shares 
and pyramiding persist; and nothing at present precludes their resurgence. 
  More democratic corporate governance holds promise because it correlates not just with 
better firm performance (Gompers Ishii, and Metrick 2003; Bebchuk and Cohen 2008), but also 
with better economy-level performance. Figure 10, from  La Porta et al. (1999), uses the  20 
largest listed companies in each major market economy worldwide to gauge the health of its 
shareholder  democracy  as  of  1996.  The  length  of  each  bar  is  the  mean  voting  stake  of  the 
controlling shareholder. The lighter part of the bars is the controlling shareholder‘s mean actual 21 
 
stock ownership. The larger the difference, or control wedge, the worse the state of shareholder 
democracy. La Porta et al. (1997; 2000; 2002) find weak shareholder democracy, measured in 
various ways, including that displayed in the figure, to correlate with stunted financial systems, 
depressed shareholder value, and a dearth of start-up firms.  
The figure shows shareholder democracy in Canada markedly weaker than in any other 
Common Law country because of the pyramiding and dual class shares then prominent. While 
Canada scores well on other metrics, such as the laws on the books giving shareholders legal 
rights against managers (La Porta et al. 1997), this creates a strong circumstantial case that weak 
shareholder democracy underlies Canada‘s long weakened economic performance.  
In  today‘s  global  economy,  Canada  must  compete  for  the  savings  of  Canadians  and 
foreigners alike. Countries whose stocks give investors a rawer deal lose savings to countries 
whose stocks offer better terms. Labour versus capital conflicts are ebbing, as workers discover 
the importance of shareholder wealth creation to their pension funds and their quality of life in 
retirement.  
  Canada‘s  economy  survived  the  Panic  of  2008  in  better  shape  than  many  others, 
including America, and this is most likely due to its relatively conservative stance on banking 
deregulation  (Ratnovski  and  Huang  2009).    It  would  be  nice  to  credit  improved  corporate 
governance across the board for this resilience, but this would be unwarranted. Figures 11 and 12 
reveal  relatively  subdued  trading  activity  and  a  relatively  unimpressive  total  market 
capitalization in comparison to the averages across common law countries; though Canada looks 






Control Blocks in Canada and Other Countries 
   
The total length of each bar is the size of the average voting control block in the top  20 listed firms, 
ranked by market capitalization, in each country. The light grey segment of each bar is the average actual 
ownership stake of the controlling shareholder. The darker grey segment is the average control wedge: 
the average excess of that shareholder’s voting power over his or her ownership stake, and is due either 






Stock Market Activity: Shares Traded as Fraction of GDP (2004 and 2009 Data)   
 
Source: World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 2010. 
 





























































Stock Market Size: Market Capitalization as Fraction of GDP (2004 and 2009)   
 




   




























































What Is a Liberal Democracy to Do?  
 
Canada  is  now  establishing  a  federal  securities  regulator.  This  long  overdue  application  of 
federal power may well foster a larger and more active financial system.  But the social purpose 
of the financial system is not to be large and active, but to allocate the nation‘s savings to the 
highest value uses.  This section lays out a spectrum of policy alternatives paths federal securities 
regulation might follow, along with their likely costs and benefits to the economy.   
Larger and more active stock markets correlate with faster and more sustained economic 
growth (King and Levine (1993; Gompers and Lerner 1986, 2006; Levine 1997; Jovanovic and 
Rousseau 2001, 2002, 2003) and others.  Sophisticated financial systems appear to augment 
economy growth primarily by letting new firms list and tap the nation‘s savings (Schumpeter, 
1911; Djankov et al. 2002), not by catering to old firms‘ insiders (Fogel et al. 2008).  Rajan and 
Zingales (2003) go further, presenting evidence of entrenched elites in  the mid 20
th century 
actively  undermining  local  stock  markets  to  block  the  rise  of  competitors  and  lock  in  a 
favourable (to them) status quo. Indeed, they directly link stunted stock markets to cozy clubby 
corporate governance and a dearth of dynamic start-ups.   
A  federal  securities  regulator  will  have  to  contend  with  a  set  of  uniquely  Canadian 
problems: a long tradition of incestuous private-public partnership, a deep social democratic 
vein, and an oddly leftist nationalism.  (Nationalists lie to the right in most countries.) These 
problems complicate economic regulation in general, but are likely to be especially salient to 
federal securities regulation.    
The incest problem is protected by institutional inertia.  Corporate insiders have long 
grown  used  to  the  idea  that  securities  regulators  exist  to  protect  them  from  impertinent 
shareholders. Provincial regulators traditionally courted the insiders of listed firms; presumably 26 
 
fearing they might move their listings elsewhere. This misapprehends the link between large, 
dynamic financial markets and economy prosperity, which is through the readier capitalization of 
innovative new firms. A regulator that sought to please as yet unknown potential entrants, rather 
than extant listed firms, would realign stock markets towards fuelling growth.   
A federal regulator is in a position to make a new start, but will encounter entrenched 
lobbies  that  press  for a continuation of the traditional model. This is already  evident in  the 
―compromises‖ that provincial securities regulation will continue in parallel with the new federal 
system and that firms may choose their regulators.  This will fail if it becomes a race to the 
bottom, with each regulator outbidding the other in allowing worse insider excesses.  However, it 
could succeed if federal regulation becomes a stamp of blue chip quality. Firms that list under 
federal regulation might then command valuation premiums by engendering greater shareholder 
trust.  But for such a stamp is to be meaningful, firms must not be able to switch regulators. 
Shareholders will not pay more for federally regulated equity if insiders can opportunistically 
switch to an accommodating provincial regulator and then legally loot their firms.       
The second problem, Canada‘s social democratic bent, pervades politics, the civil service 
and the courts. Social democracy is not per se a problem, for the modern welfare state has 
delivered  unprecedented  human  development  (Morck  and  Yeung  2010).    But  well-intended 
attempts  to  view  capital  markets  through  social  democratic  prisms  can  have  unintended 
consequences.  A good example is the Canada Business Corporations Act, which provides an 
oppression remedy that lets public shareholders pierce through chains of holding companies to 
sue controlling shareholders. Although few such suits succeed, this is precisely the sort of rights 
outside investors need in an economy dominated by controlling shareholders – in theory.  In 
practice, the country‘s social democratic tradition intervenes in the guise of the Supreme Court‘s 27 
 
interpretation of this Act.  In 2004, the Supreme Court ruled to ―accept as an accurate statement 
of  law  that  in  determining  whether  they  are  acting  with  a  view  to  the  best  interests  of  the 
corporation it may be legitimate, given all the circumstances of a given case, for the board of.‖
7   
This sounds progressive and enlightened, but actually provides corporate insiders de facto 
cover to advance their own interests at every turn, for virtually any decision advances someone‘s 
interests. By opportunistically selecting an appropriate interest group for each decision, insiders 
have free rein to do as they will. Subsequent rulings have not undone this, and remedial action by 
regulators  or  lawmakers  is  overdue.  Federal  securities  regulators  will  be  well  positioned  to 
correct this.   
The government is charged with regulating labour, the environment, and so on.  That is 
why we have labour law, environmental law, and other legislation. These bodies of law ought to 
provide  directors  to  consider,  inter  alia,  the  interests  of  shareholders,  employees,  suppliers, 
creditors, consumers, governments and the environment binding constraints on what corporate 
insiders may and may not do.  But to grant them freedom to harm labour as long as this benefits 
the environment, or to harm shareholders as long as this benefits some other interest group, 
subordinates  public  policy  to  a  private  elite  of  corporate  officers,  directors,  and  controlling 
shareholders so as to undermine both social and shareholder democracy.   
A third problem a federal securities regulator will confront is nationalism.  This awoke in 
2010, when the  federal  government, energetically  prodded by the Premier of Saskatchewan, 
blocked an Australian takeover bid for Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan.  Potash neglected to 
replace its poison pill with an enduringly effective takeover defence, such as a voting cap, and so 
sought refuge in patriotism.  While some politicians glowed in national colours, those of more 
                                                 
7 Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, 2004 SCC 68, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461 §42.   28 
 
liberal  economic  persuasion  were  left  red-faced.    The  episode‘s  aftermath  may  well  be  an 
antitakeover defence in federal securities regulations that prevents future such embarrassment.   
The idea that some takeovers ought not to happen is hard to dispute (Morck et al. 1990), 
and some sort of filter is easy to justify.  However, an economically sensible filter – one that 
passes  governance-improving  takeovers  and  blocks  empire-building  ones  –  is  very  hard  to 
design.  The Potash system of case-by-case political lobbying to block takeovers on vague‖ 
national interest‖ grounds, is surely the worst of all options, for it subjects corporate officers and 
directors‘  careers  to  political  influence.  Much  empirical  evidence  links  politicized  corporate 
governance  to  dramatically  inefficient  resource  allocation  (Faccio  2006;  Faccio  et  al.  2006; 
Krueger 1974; Haber 2000, 2002; Haber et al. 2003; Högfeldt 2005; Shleifer and Vishny 1999; 
and many others).   
Federal  securities  regulators  will  have  to  contend  with  all  three  of  these  Canadian 
quandaries.  This must be done with adept finesse if a more efficient financial system is to 
emerge.  A path must be found that accepts the political power of incumbent corporate insiders, 
the proximity of a social democratic vein to the political mainstream, and the enduring strength 
of nationalist rhetoric as cover for special interests.    
One  possible  path  is  the  American  one.  Federal  securities  regulators  could  permit 
American takeover defences  – poison pills,  staggered boards, and antitakeover laws.  These 
would shelter corporate insiders from shareholder pressure in ways that cannot attract too much 
criticism from the United States; while providing boards with weapons to stop foreign takeovers.  
Some U.S. state anti-takeover laws even evoke the Supreme Court‘s stakeholder balancing act as 
a legal defence corporate officers and directors may use to fend off shareholder lawsuits.   29 
 
However,  the  American  system  is  damned  at  home  for  leaving  underperforming 
corporate insiders in charge too long (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Gompers et al. 2003; Bebchuk 
and Cohen 2005).  Such criticisms, bolstered by the failure of US financial institutions in the 
Panic of 2008, discredit this model.  Federal securities regulators would court instant reputational 
damage by emulating it.       
Another option is Western Europe, where pyramiding, dual class shares, and powerful 
business  families  limit  shareholder  democracy.  But  this  model  too  suffers  from  its  history.  
Sweden suffered a dramatic financial collapse in the early 1990s, and European productivity lags 
that  in  the  US  too.    Where  the  European  system  arguably  works  best,  other  mechanisms  – 
intrusive  bankers,  expansive  labour  laws,  and  interventionist  bureaucrats  –  drastically  limit 
controlling shareholders‘ discretion (Botero et al. 2004; Roe 1996). Canada‘s banks are already 
vulnerable  to  charges  of  oligopoly,  and  granting  them  the  governance  powers  entrusted  to 
German  banks  (Fohlin  2005)  is  surely  politically  infeasible.    Redrafting  labour  rights  along 
European lines would also run aground on provincial jurisdiction. State intervention in business 
works  better  in  some  countries  than  others,  and  Canada  historically  falls  among  the  others 
(Arbour 1993; Borins and Brown 1986). Private public partnership is perhaps more synonymous 
to corruption in Canadian English and French (Bliss 1986; Cameron 1995) because the sweeping 
disclosure that holds Scandinavian government and business to account (Amore 2010; Campbell 
2008, Holmen et al 2007; Thomsen and Rose 2004) would be unacceptable to Canadians. In 
short, the European model is probably not viable for federal securities regulators because of the 
absence of complementary institutions that check corporate insiders in the wealthier parts of 
Europe.   30 
 
The most dangerous path is a superficial emulation of Northern Europe without its checks 
and balances, for this led Latin America to a tenaciously oligarchic capitalism punctuated by 
brief episodes of populism.
8 Extensive pyramiding entrusts the governance of the greater parts of 
their large business sectors to mere handfuls of elite families , who are all but unaccountable 
under pervasively weak labour laws, disclosure rules, and public sector corruption.  
 
FIGURE 13 




Each oval represents a Chilean corporation. Arrows represent equity control block holdings. Essentially 
all listed firms in Chile belong to pyramidal groups, each controlled by a different wealthy family and 
ranging in size from large structures encompassing many listed firms to small groups with only two listed 




Figure 13 illustrates one of Latin America‘s most economically democratic economies, 
that of Chile. Each numbered circle is a listed company, and the lines demarcate equity control 
blocks. The figure shows most listed Chilean firms controlled by one of a handful of wealthy 
                                                 
8 See Haber (2000; 2002); Haber, Razo, and  Maurer (2003).  31 
 
families. In Ecuador, an extreme case even by the standards of that continent, one huge pyramid 
entrusts  the  governance  of  virtually  the  entire  big  business  sector  to  one  family,  the  Naboa 
dynasty.  
Roosevelt attacked ―robber baron‖ in 1930s America by taxing and otherwise restyricting 
pyramiding. William Lyon Mackenzie King, Canada‘s prime minister at the time, saw no great 
problem with robber barons. Indeed, the Rockefellers endowed Harvard‘s Canada Program in his 
name.  
This  form  of  capitalism,  however,  is  the  least  successful  at  generating  widespread 
prosperity (Rajan and Zingales 2003). The concentration of power it promotes is associated with 
corruption (Fogel 2006), and inherited corporate control is no formula for corporate success – in 
Canada  (Morck,  Stangeland,  and  Yeung  2000;  Smith  and  Amoako-Adu  1999)  or  elsewhere 
(Fogel  2006;  Bennedsen  et  al.  2007;  Pérez-González  2006).
9    Yet  this  system  is  often 
enthusiastically favoured by capitalists and their heirs. Shareholder democracy, and other ways 
of restraining  robber barons,  therefore matter because they  prevent  the capitalist class from 
undermining capitalism (Rajan and Zingales 2003).   
A  final  choice  open  to  Canada‘s  federal  securities  regulators  is  the  British  path.  
Following  1930s  America  in  taxing  augmented  corporate  control  and  explicitly  limiting 
pyramiding  in  key  industries  would  require  legislation  that  would  run  up  against  powerful 
special interests.
10 But emulating Britain‘s 1960s reforms to its takeover rules might well be 
within the powers of a national securities regulator 1960s.   
                                                 
9 Expressing a minority view, Khanna and Palepu (2000) argue that such concentrated economic power usefully 
compensate for dysfunctional markets in developing economies; that is they are a ‗second best‘ solution necessitated 
by a weak business environment. As evidence, they point out that firms controlled by more powerful business 
families perform better in Chile and India.  Morck and Yeung (2004) argue that this likely reflects political influence 
rather than genuine value creation.  Khanna and Palepu (2005) disagree.   
10 Bailey (1982) shows that Canadian tax rules previously discouraged dual class shares. They could readily be 
changed to do so again.  32 
 
Given the rise of Canadian pension funds in Figure 5, and the role of British pension 
funds in that country‘s 1960s reforms (Franks, Mayer, and Rossi. 2005), the British trajectory is 
perhaps a better bet. Federally regulated firms might therefore be subjected to ―all or nothing‖ 
takeover regulation – acquirers must buy 100% or stay away.  While diluted versions of this sort 
of rule, such as the Ontario requirement that acquirers buying control blocks extend their offers 
proportionately  to  public  shareholders,  merely  encumber  acquirers;  the  full  blooded  British 
version is consistent with an active market for corporate control in the UK (Franks et al. 2005) 
and with a genuine democratic accountability of corporate insiders (Faccio and Ameziane 2000; 
Cheffins 2009).   
A key issue here is the independence of pension funds‘ boards of trustees.  In the US, 
most pension funds are controlled by business corporations, and such effects are only associated 
with  public sector pension funds, whose trustees  are more accountable  to  their beneficiaries 
(Pound 1988, 1991; Gordon and Pound 1993).  Corporate pension fund trustees are, in contrast, 
appointed by corporate CEOs and subject to a different dynamic: one firms‘ pension fund may 
support another‘s entrenched insiders in anticipation of a quid pro quo (Pound 1988).  Most 
British pension funds are trade based:  they cover all workers in a given trade and are thus more 
responsible to workers and less under the thumbs of corporate insiders (Faccio and Ameziane, 
2000).  Canadian pension funds are a mixture, and if the British model of shareholder democracy 
is to prevail successfully, would have to be rendered more like British pension funds.   
This route might also accommodate a takeover defence with fewer downsides than the 
poison pills and staggered boards of the US or the entrenched business families of Europe and 
Latin America.  Canada‘s banks are currently protected from takeovers by voting caps, which 
prevent  any  shareholder  from  acquiring  more  than  a  given  fraction  of  their  shares.    This 33 
 
effectively immunizes firms from takeovers.  However, voting caps need not protect managers 
from  shareholder  democracy  if  institutional  shareholders  can  coordinate  voting  to  oust 
underperforming CEOs, as they appear to do in the UK (Black and Coffee 1994).   
Federal  securities  regulation  might  thus  accommodate  nationalists,  and  salve  self-
interested corporate insiders too, by permitting voting caps as a takeover defence as long as 
institutional investors were also empowered sufficiently. For example, if institutional investors 
could readily nominate and campaign for opposition slates of directors, voting caps would lose 
much of their force. Takeovers can go awry, but the threat of dismissal by a raider is too useful a 
stick against slothful managers to be discarded.  One option might be to let a potential raider 
convene a shareholder meeting upon reaching the voting cap, whereat a majority of disinterested 
shareholders could vote to repeal or maintain the cap.   
This,  or  something  akin  to  it,  addresses  the  three  pressures  likely  to  sway  federal 
regulators:    Social  democracy  is  accommodated  by  empowering  employees  and  retirees  via 
independent and democratic pension funds. A hat is tipped to nationalism by letting workers‘ and 
retirees‘  representatives  vet  takeovers,  including  those  by  foreigners.  The  self-interest  of 
entrenched corporate insiders is salved with voting caps, but not so much as to wholly lose the 
market discipline hostile takeovers provide.   As in Britain, mandatory 100% bids once a certain 
threshold  –  say  20%  -  is  crossed  could  prevent  pyramiding  and  the  governance  problems 
associated with entrenched insiders running narrowly held firms.  This would also continue the 
trend towards less pyramiding and fewer dual class equity structures by leaving listed firms 
widely held and fully subject to shareholder democracy.  Were this course pursued, listed firms 
would end up democratically governed and controlled firms would end up private.  34 
 
Of course, pension funds themselves can be misgoverned, so enhanced democracy there 
too might be considered. Many corporate pension funds are controlled by chief financial officers, 
not employees; and are run as organs of the sponsoring corporation (Lakonishok et al. 1991; 
1992). Many public sector pension funds are run by political appointees with their own agendas 
(Romano 1993a). Clearly, real shareholder democracy would empower the ultimate owners of 
the shares: workers and retirees. For shareholder democracy to capture the center ground of 
Canadian  politics,  democratic  accountability  of  institutional  investor  management  to 
beneficiaries would have to be part of the picture, though both extremes of the political spectrum 
might equally dislike this.    
Weiler (1990) argues persuasively that granting labour stronger rights is good for the 
economy and the general welfare. His most cogent arguments support workers rights to organize 
and a level playing field upon which organized labour and management negotiate. With labour 
unions  in  decline,  pension  funds  might  provide  another  route  to  both  sorts  of  labour 
empowerment. Workers could organize by electing pension fund trustees, and influence major 
economic  decisions  by  commanding  votes  at  genuinely  democratic  shareholder  meetings.  
Perhaps  in  the  twenty-first  century  ―capital-labour  dispute‖  will  even  come  to  mean  a 
shareholder meeting wherein investors and pension funds combine forces to dispute the policies 
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